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ABSTRACT
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. De-
spite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information struc-
tures to ameliorate the overall experience of the network users. We focus on Bayesian games with
atomic players, where network vagaries are modeled via a (random) state of nature which determines
the costs incurred by the players. A third-party entity—the sender—can observe the realized state
of the network and exploit this additional information to send a signal to each player. A natural
question is the following: is it possible for an informed sender to reduce the overall social cost
via the strategic provision of information to players who update their beliefs rationally? The paper
focuses on the problem of computing optimal ex ante persuasive signaling schemes, showing that
symmetry is a crucial property for its solution. Indeed, we show that an optimal ex ante persuasive
signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time when players are symmetric and have affine
cost functions. Moreover, the problem becomes NP-hard when players are asymmetric, even in
non-Bayesian settings.
1 Introduction
Network congestion games, where players seek to minimize their own costs selfishly, are a canonical example of a set-
ting where externalities may induce socially inefficient outcomes [Roughgarden, 2005]. In real-world problems, the
state of the network may be uncertain, and not known to its users (e.g., drivers may not be aware of road works and ac-
cidents in a road network). This setting is modeled via Bayesian network congestion games (BNCGs). We investigate
whether providing players with partial information about the state of the network may mitigate inefficiencies.
We model this information-structure design problem through the Bayesian persuasion framework
by Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]. At its core, this framework involves an informed sender trying to influ-
ence the behavior of a set of self-interested players—the receivers—via the provision of payoff-relevant information.
We focus on the notion of ex ante persuasiveness, as introduced by Xu [2019] and Celli et al. [2019], where players
commit to following the sender’s recommendations having observed only the information structure. This assumes
credible receivers’ commitments, which is reasonable in practice. In our setting, where signaling schemes are usually
implemented as software (e.g., real-time traffic apps), it is natural to assume that each player decides to either follow
the signaling scheme (i.e., adopting the software) or act based on his prior belief. Moreover, on a general level, the
receivers will uphold their ex ante commitment every time they reason with a long-term horizon where a reputation
for credibility positively affects their utility [Rayo and Segal, 2010]. In some cases, the receivers could also be forced
to stick to their ex ante commitment by contractual agreements or penalties.
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Related Works Arnott et al. [1991] and Acemoglu et al. [2018] study the impact of information on traffic con-
gestion. Several recent works focus on non-atomic games [Das et al., 2017; Massicot and Langbort, 2019; Wu et al.,
2018; Vasserman et al., 2015]. Bhaskar et al. [2016] study the inapproximability of finding optimal ex interim per-
suasive signaling schemes in non-atomic games. Liu and Whinston [2019] focus on atomic games with costs un-
certainties and study ex interim persuasion by placing stringent constraints on the network structure. To the best
of our knowledge, the present work is the first studying ex ante persuasion in general atomic BNCGs. Other
works study the problem of correlation in non-Bayesian congestion games [Christodoulou and Koutsoupias, 2005;
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008]. The closest to our work is that of Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011], who pro-
vide a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal coarse correlated equilibrium (i.e., an ex ante persuasive signaling
scheme in the non-Bayesian setting) in simple games with symmetric players selecting a single resource (a.k.a. single-
ton congestion games).
Original Contributions We investigate whether it is possible to efficiently compute optimal (i.e., minimizing the
social cost) ex ante persuasive signaling schemes in BNCGs. First, we show that an optimal ex ante persuasive
signaling scheme can be compute in poly-time in symmetric BNCGs with affine costs. To prove this result, we exploit
the ellipsoid algorithm by designing a sophisticated polynomial-time separation oracle based on a suitably defined
min-cost flow problem. Then, we show that symmetry is a crucial property for efficient signaling by proving that it
is NP-hard to compute an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme in asymmetric BNCGs. Our reduction proves
an even stronger hardness result, as it works for non-Bayesian singleton congestion games with affine costs, which is
arguably the simplest class of asymmetric congestion games. Furthermore, in such setting, a solution to our problem
is an optimal coarse correlated equilibrium and, thus, its computation is NP-hard.
2 Signaling in Network Congestion Games
We study atomic network congestion games where edge costs depend on a stochastic state of nature, defined as follows.
Network Congestion Game (NCG) A network congestion game [Fabrikant et al., 2004] is defined as a tuple
(N,G, {ce}e∈E , {(sp, tp)}p∈N ), where: N := {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players; G := (V,E) is the directed
graph underlying the game, with V being its set of nodes and each e = (v, v′) ∈ E representing a directed edge from
v to v′; {ce}e∈E are the edge costs, with each ce : N → R+ defining the cost of edge e ∈ E as a function of the
number of players traveling through e; finally, {(sp, tp)}p∈N , with sp, tp ∈ V , denote the source-destination pairs for
all the players. As usual, we assume that ce(0) = 0 for all e ∈ E. In an NCG, the set Ap of actions available to a
player p ∈ N is implicitly defined by the graphG, the source sp, and the destination tp. Formally, Ap is the set of all
directed paths from sp to tp in the graph G. In this work, we use ap ∈ Ap to denote a player p’s path and we write
e ∈ ap whenever the path contains the edge e ∈ E. An action profile a ∈ A, where A :=×p∈NAp, is a tuple of
sp-tp directed paths ap ∈ Ap, one per player p ∈ N . For the ease of notation, given an action profile a ∈ A, we let
fae be the congestion of edge e ∈ E in a, i.e., the number of players selecting a path passing thorough e in a; formally,
fae := |{p ∈ N | e ∈ ap}|. Thus, ce(f
a
e ) denotes the cost of edge e in a. Finally, the cost incurred by player p ∈ N in
an action profile a ∈ A is denoted by cp(a) :=
∑
e∈ap
ce(f
a
e ).
Bayesian Network Congestion Game (BNCG) We define a Bayesian network congestion game as a tuple
(N,G,Θ, µ, {ce,θ}e∈E,θ∈Θ, {(sp, tp)}p∈N ), where, differently from the basic setting, the edge cost functions ce,θ :
N→ R+ also depend on a state of nature θ drawn from a finite set of states Θ. Moreover, µ encodes the prior beliefs
that the players have over the states of nature, i.e., µ ∈ int(∆Θ) is a fully-supported probability distribution over the
set Θ, with µθ denoting the prior probability that the state of nature is θ ∈ Θ. All the other components are defined as
in non-Bayesian NCGs. Notice that, in BNCGs, the cost experienced by player p ∈ N in an action profile a ∈ A also
depends on the state of nature θ ∈ Θ, and, thus, it is defined as cp,θ(a) :=
∑
e∈ap
ce,θ(f
a
e ). A BNCG is symmetric
if all the players share the same (sp, tp) pair, i.e., whenever they all have the same set of actions (paths). For the ease
of notation, in such settings we let s, t ∈ V be the common source and destination. Moreover, we focus on BNCGs
with affine costs, i.e., for all e ∈ E and θ ∈ Θ, there exist constants αe,θ, βe,θ ∈ R+ such that the edge cost function
is ce,θ(f
a
e ) := αe,θf
a
e + βe,θ .
1
Signaling in BNCGs Suppose that a BNCG is employed to model a road network subject to vagaries. It is reasonable
to assume that third-party entities (e.g., the road management company) may have access to the realized state of nature.
We call one such entity the sender. We focus on the following natural question: is it possible for an informed sender to
1We focus on affine costs since: (i) the assumption is reasonable in many applications [Vasserman et al., 2015], and (ii) the
problem is trivially NP-hard when generic costs are allowed (see Section 4).
2
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mitigate the overall costs through the strategic provision of information to players who update their beliefs rationally?
The sender can publicly commit to a signaling scheme which maps the realized state of nature to a signal for each
player. The sender can exploit general private signaling schemes, sending different signals to each player through
private communication channels. In this setting, a simple revelation-principle-style argument shows that it is enough
to employ players’ actions as signals [Arieli and Babichenko, 2016; Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011]. Therefore, a
private signaling scheme is a function φ : Θ → ∆A which maps any state of nature to a probability distribution over
action profiles (signals), and recommends action ap to player p. The probability of recommending an action profile
a ∈ A having observed the state of nature θ ∈ Θ is denoted by φθ,a. Then, it has to hold
∑
a∈A φθ,a = 1, for
each θ ∈ Θ. A signaling scheme is persuasive if following recommendations is an equilibrium of the underlying
Bayesian game [Bergemann and Morris, 2016a,b]. We focus on the notion of ex ante persuasiveness as defined by Xu
[2019] and Celli et al. [2019].
Definition 1. A signaling scheme φ : Θ→ ∆A is ex ante persuasive if, for each p ∈ N and ap ∈ Ap, it holds:
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a′=(a′p,a−p)∈A
φθ,a′
(
cp,θ(ap, a−p)− cp,θ(a
′)
)
≥ 0.
Then, a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) [Moulin and Vial, 1978] may be seen as an ex ante persuasive signaling
scheme when |Θ| = 1. Finally, a sender’s optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme φ∗ is such that it minimizes
the expected social cost of the solution, i.e.:
φ∗ ∈ argmin
φ
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a∈A
φθ,a
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a).
The following example illustrates the interaction flow between the sender and the players (receivers).
s t
αA = 30, βA = 0
αB,θ0
=1, βB,θ0
=0
αB,θ1
=0, βB,θ1
=100
Signals
(B,B,B) (A,A,B) (A,B,A) (B,A,A)
θ0 1 0 0 0
θ1 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
Figure 1: Left: BNCG for Example 1. Right: An ex ante persuasive signaling scheme for the case with n = 3. The table displays
only those a ∈ A such that φθ,a > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ = {θ0, θ1}.
Example 1. Figure 1 (Left) describes a simple BNCG modeling the road network between the Tokyo Haneda airport
(node s), and Yokohama (node t). It is late at night and three lone researchers have to reach the IJCAI venue. They
are following navigation instructions from the same application, whose provider (the sender) has access to the current
state of the roads (called A and B, respectively). Roads costs (i.e., travel times) are depicted in Figure 1 (Left). In
normal conditions (state θ0), road B is extremely fast (αB = 1 and βB = 0). However, it requires frequent road works
for maintenance (state θ1), which increase the travel time. Moreover, it holds µθ0 = µθ1 = 1/2. The interaction
between the sender and the three players goes as follows: (i) the sender commits to a signaling scheme φ; (ii) the
players observe φ and decide whether to adhere to the navigation system or not; (iii) the sender observes the realized
state of nature and exploits this knowledge to compute recommendations. Figure 1 (Right) describes an ex ante
persuasive signaling scheme. In this case, when the state of nature is θ1, one of the players is randomly selected to
take road B, even if it is undergoing maintenance. In expectation, following the sender’s recommendations is strictly
better than congesting road A.
A simple variation of Example 1 is enough to show that the introduction of signaling allows the sender to reach
solutions with arbitrarily better expected social cost than what can be achieved via the optimal Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in absence of signaling. Specifically, consider the BNCG in Figure 1 (Left) with the following modifications: n = 1,
β coefficients always equal to zero, αA,θ0 =∞, αA,θ1 = 0, αB,θ0 = 0, and αB,θ1 =∞. Without signaling, the optimal
choice yields an expected social cost of∞. However, a perfectly informative signal allows the players to avoid any
cost.
3 The Power of Symmetry
We design a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme in symmetric
BNCGs with affine cost functions. Our algorithm exploits the ellipsoid method. We first formulate the problem as an
3
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LP (Problem (1)) with polynomially many constraints and exponentially many variables. Then, we show how to find
an optimal solution to the LP in polynomial time by applying the ellipsoid algorithm to its dual (Problem (2)), which
features polynomially many variables and exponentially many constraints. This calls for a polynomial-time separation
oracle for Problem (2), which is not readily available since the problem has an exponential number of constraints. We
prove that, in our setting, a polynomial-time separation oracle can be implemented by solving a suitably defined min-
cost flow problem. The proof of this result crucially relies on the symmetric nature of the problem and the assumption
that the costs are affine functions of the edge congestion.
The following lemma shows how to formulate the problem as an LP. 2 For the ease of presentation, we use I{e/∈ap} to
denote the indicator function for the event e /∈ ap, i.e., it holds I{e/∈ap} = 1 if e /∈ ap, while I{e/∈ap} = 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1. Given a symmetric BNCG, an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme φ can be found with the LP:
min
φ≥0,x
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a∈A
φθ,a
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a) (1a)
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a∈A
cp,θ(a)φθ,a ≤ xp,s ∀p ∈ N (1b)
xp,v ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a∈A
ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
φθ,a + xp,v′ ∀p ∈ N, ∀e = (v, v
′) ∈ E (1c)
xp,t = 0 ∀p ∈ N (1d)∑
a∈A
φθ,a = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θ (1e)
Proof. Clearly, Objective (1a) is equivalent to minimizing the social cost, while Constraints (1e) imply that φ is well
formed. Constraints (1b) enforce ex ante persuasiveness for every player p ∈ N : the expression on the left-hand side
represents player p’s expected cost, while xp,s is the cost of her best deviation (i.e., a cost-minimizing path given µ
and φ). This is ensured by Constraints (1c) and (1d). In particular, for every player p ∈ N and node v ∈ V \ {t},
the former guarantee that xp,v is the minimum cost of a path from v to t. This is shown by noticing that (given that
xp,t = 0) such cost can be inductively defined as follows:
min
v′∈V :
e=(v,v′)∈E
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
a∈A
ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
φθ,a + xp,v′ ,
where fae + I{e/∈ap} accounts for the fact that the congestion of edge e must be incremented by one if player p does
not select a path containing e in the action profile a.
Lemma 2. The dual of Problem (1) reads as follows:
max
y
∑
θ∈Θ
yθ (2a)
µθ

∑
p∈P
cp,θ(a)yp −
∑
p∈P
∑
e∈E
ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
yp,e

+ yθ ≤ µθ
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀a ∈ A (2b)
∑
v′∈V :e=(v,v′)∈E
yp,e −
∑
v′∈V :e=(v′,v)∈E
yp,e = 0 ∀p ∈ N, ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t} (2c)
∑
v∈V :e=(s,v)∈E
yp,e −
∑
p∈N
yp = 0 ∀p ∈ N (2d)
∑
p∈N
yp,t −
∑
v∈V :e=(v,t)∈E
yp,e = 0 ∀p ∈ N (2e)
yp ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ N (2f)
yp,e ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ N, ∀e ∈ E. (2g)
Proof. It directly follows from duality, by letting yp (for p ∈ N ), yp,e (for p ∈ N and e ∈ E), yp,t (for p ∈ N ), and
yθ (for θ ∈ Θ) be the dual variables associated to, respectively, Constraints (1b), (1c), (1d), and (1e).
2LPs analogous to Problem (1) and Problem (2) can also be derived for the asymmetric setting. However, the separation problem
for the latter is solvable in poly-time only in the symmetric case.
4
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Since |A| is exponential in the size of the game, Problem (1) features exponentially many variables, while its number
of constraints is polynomial. Conversely, Problem (2) has polynomially many variables and exponentially many
constraints, which enables the use of the ellipsoid algorithm to find an optimal solution to Problem (2) in polynomial
time. 3 This requires a polynomial-time separation oracle for Problem (2), i.e., a procedure that, given a vector y of
dual variables, it either establishes that y is feasible for Problem (2) or, if not, it outputs an hyperplane separating
y from the feasible region. In the following, we focus on a particular type of separation oracles: those generating
violated constraints.
Given that Problem (2) has an exponential number of constraints, a polynomial-time separation oracle is not readily
available. It turns out that, in our setting, we can design one by leveraging the symmetry of the players and the fact
that the cost functions are affine, as described in the following.
First, we prove that Problem (2) always admits an optimal player-symmetric solution, i.e., a vector y such that, for
each pair of players p, q ∈ N , it holds yp = yq, yp,e = yq,e for all e ∈ E, and yp,t = yq,t. This result allows us to
restrict the attention to player-symmetric vectors y.
Lemma 3. Problem (2) always admits an optimal player-symmetric solution.
Proof. Given any optimal solution y to Problem (2), we can always recover, in polynomial time, a player-symmetric
optimal solution y˜. Specifically, for every p ∈ N , let y˜p =
∑
p∈N yp
n , y˜p,e =
∑
p∈N yp,e
n for all e ∈ E, and y˜p,t =∑
p∈N yp,t
n , while y˜θ = yθ for every θ ∈ Θ. First, notice that y and y˜ provide the same objective value, as y˜θ = yθ for
all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, we only need to prove that y˜ satisfies all the constraints of Problem (2). For a ∈ A and i ∈ [n], let
us denote with πi(a) an action profile a
′ ∈ A such that a′p = a((p+i) mod n), i.e., a permutation of a in which each
player p ∈ N takes on the role of player (p + i) mod n. Moreover, let π(a) =
⋃
i∈[n] πi(a). Constraints (2b) are
satisfied by y˜, since, for every θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A, it holds:
µθ

∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a)y˜p −
∑
p∈P
∑
e∈E
ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
y˜p,e

+ y˜θ =
=
1
n
∑
a′∈π(a)
µθ

∑
p∈P
cp,θ(a
′)yp −
∑
p∈P
∑
e∈E
ce,θ
(
fa
′
e + I{e/∈a′p}
)
yp,e

+ yθ ≤
≤
1
n
∑
a′∈π(a)
µθ
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a
′) = µθ
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a
′).
Similar arguments show that y˜ satisfies all the other constraints, concluding the proof.
Notice that any polynomial-time separation oracle for Problem (2) can explicitly check whether each member of the
polynomially many Constraints (2c), (2d), and (2e) is satisfied for the given y. Thus, we focus on the separation
problem restricted to the exponentially many Constraints (2b), which, using Lemma 3, can be formulated as stated in
the following.
Lemma 4. Given a player-symmetric y, solving the separation problem for Constraints (2b) amounts to finding θ ∈ Θ
and a ∈ A that are optimal for the following problem:
min
θ∈Θ,a∈A
µθ

(1− y¯)
∑
p∈N
cp,θ(a)−
∑
p∈N
∑
e∈E
ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
y¯e

− yθ, (3)
where we let y¯ = yp and y¯e = yp,e for all e ∈ E.
Next, we show how Problem (3) can be equivalently formulated avoiding the minimization over the exponentially-
sized set A. Intuitively, we rely on the fact that, for a fixed θ ∈ Θ, we can exploit the symmetry of the players to
equivalently represent action profiles a ∈ A as integer vectors q of edge congestions qe ∈ [n], for all e ∈ E.
3For additional details on how the ellipsoid algorithm can be adopted to solve optimization problems see [Grötschel et al., 1981].
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Lemma 5. Problem (3) can be formulated asminθ∈Θ χ(θ), where χ(θ) is the optimal value of the following problem:
min
q∈Z
|E|
+
(1− y¯)
∑
e∈E
αe,θq
2
e + βe,θqe −
∑
e∈E
y¯e
(
nαe,θqe + (n− qe)αe,θ + nβe,θ
)
(4a)
∑
v∈V :e=(s,v)∈E
qe = n (4b)
∑
v∈V :e=(v,t)∈E
qe = n (4c)
∑
v′∈V :
e=(v′,v)∈E
qe =
∑
v′∈V :
e=(v,v′)∈E
qe ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t} (4d)
Proof. First, given a state θ ∈ Θ, Problem (3) reduces to computing χ(θ) := mina∈A(1 − y¯)
∑
p∈N cp,θ(a) −∑
p∈N
∑
e∈E ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
y¯e, where the function to be minimized only depends on the number of players
selecting each edge e ∈ E in a, rather than the identity of the players who are choosing e (since they are symmetric).
Letting q(e) ∈ [n] be the congestion level of edge e ∈ E and using ce,θ = αe,θqe + βe,θ (affine costs), it holds∑
p∈N cp,θ(a) =
∑
e∈E αe,θq
2
e+βe,θqe, and, for every e ∈ E,
∑
p∈N ce,θ
(
fae + I{e/∈ap}
)
= nαe,θqe+(n−qe)ae,θ+
nβe,θ . This gives Objective (4a). Moreover, Constraints (4b), (4c), and (4d) ensure that q is well defined.
Let us remark that computing an optimal integer solution to Problem (4) is necessary in order to (possibly) find a
violated constraint for the given y; otherwise, we would not be able to easily recover an action profile a ∈ A from a
vector q.
Now, we show that an optimal integer solution to Problem (4) can be found in polynomial time by reducing it to an
instance of integer min-cost flow problem. Intuitively, it is sufficient to consider a modified version of the original
graphG in which each edge e ∈ E is replaced with n parallel edges with unit capacity and increasing unit costs. This
is possible given that the Objective (4a) is a convex function of q, which is guaranteed by the assumption that the costs
are affine.
Lemma 6. An optimal integer solution to Problem (4) can be found in polynomial time by solving a suitably defined
instance of integer min-cost flow problem.
Proof. First, notice that Objective (4a) is a sum edge costs, in which the cost of each edge e ∈ E is a convex function
of the edge congestion qe, as the only quadratic term is (1 − y¯)ae,θq
2
e , where the multiplying coefficient is always
positive, given y¯ ≤ 0 and αe,θ ≥ 0. This allows us to formulate Problem (4) as an instance of integer min-cost flow
problem. We build a new graph where each e ∈ E is replaced with n parallel edges, say ei for i ∈ [n]. For e ∈ E and
i ∈ [n], let us define g(e, i) := (1 − y¯)
(
αe,θi
2 + βei
)
− y¯e (nαe,θi+ (n− i)αe,θ + nβe,θ). Each (new) edge ei has
unit capacity and a per-unit cost equal to δ(ei) := g(e, i) − g(e, i − 1). Clearly, finding an integer min-cost flow is
equivalent to minimizing Objective (4a). Notice that, since the original edge costs are convex, it holds δ(ei) ≥ δ(ej)
for all j < i ∈ [n]. Thus, an edge ei is used (i.e., it carries a unit of flow) only if all the edges ej , for j < i ∈ [n], are
already used. This allows us to recover an integer vector q from a solution to the min-cost flow problem. Finally, let
us recall that we can find an optimal solution to the integer min-cost flow problem in polynomial time by solving its
LP relaxation.
The last lemma allows us to prove our main result:
Theorem 1. Given a symmetric BNCG, an optimal ex-ante persuasive signaling scheme can be computed in poly-time.
Proof. The algorithm applies the ellipsoid algorithm to Problem (2). At each iteration, we require that the vector of
dual variables y given to the separation oracle be player-symmetric, which can be easily obtained by applying the
symmetrization technique introduced in the proof of Lemma 3. The separation oracle needs to solve an instance of
integer min-cost flow problem for every θ ∈ Θ (see Lemmas 5 and 6). Notice that an integer solution is required in
order to be able to identify a violated constraint. Finally, the polynomially many violated constraints generated by the
ellipsoid algorithm can be used to compute an optimal φ.
6
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4 The Curse of Asymmetry
In this section, we provide our hardness result on asymmetric BNCGs. Our proof is split into two intermediate steps:
(i)we prove the hardness for a simple class of asymmetric non-Bayesian congestion games in which each player selects
only one resource (Lemma 7), and (ii) we show that such games can be represented as NCGs with only a polynomial
blow-up in the representation size (Lemma 8). Our main result reads:
Theorem 2. The problem of computing an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme in BNCGs with asymmetric
players is NP-hard, even with affine costs. 4
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on a reduction which maps an instance of 3SAT (a well-known NP-hard problem,
see [Garey and Johnson, 1979]) to a game in the class of singleton congestion games (SCGs) [Ieong et al., 2005]. A
(non-Bayesian) SCG is described by a tuple (N,R, {Ap}p∈N , {cr}r∈R), where R is a finite set of resources, each
player p ∈ N selects a single resource from the set Ap ⊆ R of available resources, and resource r ∈ R has a cost
cr : N → R+. Another way of interpreting SCGs is as games played on parallel-link graphs, where each player can
select only a subset of the edges.
First, let us provide the following definition and notation.
Definition 2 (3SAT). Given a finite set C of three-literal clauses defined over a finite set V of variables, is there a
truth assignment to the variables satisfying all the clauses?
We denote with l ∈ ϕ a literal (i.e., a variable or its negation) appearing in a clause ϕ ∈ C. Moreover, we letm and s
be, respectively, the number of clauses and variables, i.e.,m := |C| and s := |V |. W.l.o.g., we assume thatm ≥ s.
Lemma 7 introduces our main reduction, proving that finding a social-cost-minimizing CCE is NP-hard in SCGs with
asymmetric players, i.e., whenever the resource sets Ap are different among each other.
5 Notice that the games used
in the reduction are not Bayesian; this shows that the hardness fundamentally resides in the asymmetry of the players.
Lemma 7. The problem of computing a social-cost-minimizing CCE in SCGs with asymmetric players is NP-hard,
even with affine costs.
Proof. Our 3SAT reduction shows that the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a social-cost-
minimizing CCE in SCGs would allow us to solve any 3SAT instance in polynomial time. Given (C, V ), let z := m30,
u := m12, and ǫ := 1m4 . We build an SCG Γ(C, V ) admitting a CCE with social cost smaller than or equal to
γ := z2 + (4us+ s+ 3m)(z − u) + 3zm9 iff (C, V ) is satisfiable.
Mapping. Γ(C, V ) is defined as follows (for every r ∈ R, the cost cr is an affine function with coefficients αr and
βr).
• N = {pv | v ∈ V } ∪ {pϕ,q | ϕ ∈ C, q ∈ [3]} ∪ {pv,j , pv¯,j | v ∈ V, j ∈ [2u]} ∪ {pi | i ∈ [z]};
• R = {rt} ∪ {rv, rv¯, rv,1, rv,2, rv¯,1, rv¯,2 | v ∈ V };
• Apv = {rv, rv¯, rt} ∀v ∈ V ;
• Apϕ,q = {rl | l ∈ ϕ} ∀ ϕ ∈ C, ∀q ∈ [3];
• Apv,j = {rv, rv,1, rv,2} ∀v ∈ V, ∀j ∈ [2u];
• Apv¯,j = {rv¯, rv¯,1, rv¯,2} ∀v ∈ V, ∀j ∈ [2u];
• Api = {rt} ∀i ∈ [z];
• αrv = αrv¯ = ǫ and βrv = βrv¯ = z + 1− ǫ ∀v ∈ V ;
• αrv,1 = αrv,2 = αrv¯,1 = αrv¯,2 = 1 ∀v ∈ V ;
• βrv,1 = βrv,2 = βrv¯,1 = βrv¯,2 = z + 1− u ∀ v ∈ V ;
• αrt = 1 and βrt = 0;
If. Suppose (C, V ) is satisfiable, and let τ : V → {T,F} be a truth assignment satisfying all the clauses in C. Using
τ , we recover a CCE φ ∈ ∆A with social cost smaller than or equal to γ, having in its support the action profiles
4Without affine costs, computing an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme is triviallyNP-hard even in symmetric BNCGs.
This directly follows fromMeyers and Schulz [2012], which show that even finding an optimal action profile (that is also an optimal
Nash equilibrium) is NP-hard in symmetric (non-Bayesian) NCGs.
5The reduction in Lemma 7 does not rely on standard constructions, as most of the reductions for congestion games only work
with action profiles, while ours needs randomization. Indeed, in asymmetric SCGs, a social-cost-minimizing action profile can be
computed in poly-time by solving a suitable instance of min-cost flow. This also prevents the use of other techniques for proving
the hardness of CCEs, such as, e.g., those by Barman and Ligett [2015].
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ak = (akp)p∈N ∈×p∈NAp for k ∈ [3], defined as follows. First, let us consider a congestion game ΓR restricted to
the players in {pϕ,q | ϕ ∈ C, q ∈ [3]}, with action spaces limited to the resources rl ∈ Apϕ,q with τ(l) = T (since τ
satisfies all clauses, each player has at least one action). Clearly, ΓR admits a pure NE [Rosenthal, 1973]. Moreover,
we show that, in any pure NE, each resource is selected by at least one player. By contradiction, suppose that there
exists a resource rl such that no player pϕ,q chooses it. Then, there must be at least two players pϕ,q (with l ∈ ϕ)
selecting a resource different from rl. It is easy to check that, then, there must be one player with an incentive to
deviate, contradicting the NE assumption. For every ϕ ∈ C and q ∈ [3], we let a1pϕ,q (respectively, a
2
pϕ,q and a
3
pϕ,q )
be equal to the resource played by the corresponding player in a pure NE of ΓR. For every literal l ∈ {v, v¯ | v ∈ V }
and j ∈ [u], we let a1pl,j = rl,1, a
2
pl,j
= rl,2, and a
3
pl,j
= rl if τ(l) = F, while a
3
pl,j
= rl,1 if τ(l) = T. Similarly,
for j ∈ [2u] : j > u, we let a1pl,j = rl,2, a
2
pl,j
= rl,1, and a
3
pl,j
= rl if τ(l) = F, while a
3
pl,j
= rl,2 otherwise.
For every v ∈ V , we let a3pv = rt and a
1
pv = a
2
pv = rv if τ(v) = F, while a
1
pv = a
2
pv = rv¯ if not. Finally, we let
φa1 = φa2 =
1
2 −
1
2m10 , while φa3 =
1
m10 . We show that players have no incentive to defect from φ. Given that player
pϕ,q’s action (for ϕ ∈ C and q ∈ [3]) is determined by a pure NE of ΓR, she does not have any incentive to select a
resource rl ∈ Aϕ,q with τ(l) = T (as it is not selected by other players). Moreover, in φ, player pϕ,q’s expected cost
is at most z + 1 + 3ǫm, while she would pay at least (z + 1 + ǫ)(1 − 1m10 ) + (z + 1 + 2uǫ)
1
m10 = z + 1 + 2ǫm
2
by selecting a resource rl ∈ Aϕ,q with τ(l) = F. Each player pv (for v ∈ V ) does not defect from φ, since her
expected cost is (z + 1)(1 − 1m10 ) + (z + s)
1
m10 , while she would pay: (i) the same by switching to rt, (ii) at least
(z + 1 + ǫ) by playing rl with l ∈ {v, v¯} and τ(l) = T (as there is at least one player pϕ,q on rl), or (iii) at least
(z+1)(1− 1m10 )+(z+1+2uǫ)
1
m10 = z+1+2
1
m2 by selecting rl with l ∈ {v, v¯} and τ(l) = F. Each player pl,j (for
l ∈ {v, v¯ | v ∈ V } and j ∈ [2u]) with τ(l) = F does not deviate, since her cost is (z+1)(1− 1m10 )+(z+1−ǫ+2uǫ)
1
m10 ,
while she would pay: (i) at least (z + 1)(12 −
1
2m10 ) + (z + 2)(
1
2 −
1
2m10 ) by switching to either rl,1 or rl,2, or (ii) at
least (z + 1+ ǫ)(1− 1m10 ) + (z + 1− ǫ+ 2uǫ)
1
m10 by selecting resource rl ∈ Apl,j . Moreover, each player pl,j with
τ(l) = T does not deviate either, as her cost is (z + 1), while she would pay: (i) at least (z + 1 + ǫ) by playing rl, or
(ii) at least (z + 1)(12 +
1
2m10 ) + (z + 2)(
1
2 −
1
2m10 ) by switching to either rl,1 or rl,2. Finally, the CCE provides a
social cost smaller than or equal to (z2+(4us+s+3m)(z+u))(1− 1m10 )+((z+s)
2+(4us+m)(z+u)) 1m10 ≤ γ,
where the last inequality comes from 2u(4us+ s+ 3m) + s
2
m10 ≤
z
m9 .
Only if. Suppose there exists a CCE φ ∈ ∆A with social cost smaller than or equal to γ. First, we prove that, with
probability at most 1m8 , at least one player pv plays rt. By contradiction, assume that this is not the case. Then, the
social cost would be at least (z2+(4us+ s+3m)(z− u))(1− 1m8 )+ ((z+1)
2+(4us+ s+3m− 1)(z− u)) 1m8 ≥
z2+(4us+s+3m)(z−u)+(2z−z) 1m8 > γ. This implies that each player pv is playing either rv or rv¯ with probability
at least 1− 1m8 . We prove that pv is the only player on that resource with probability at least 1−
1
m8 −
1
m2 . Otherwise,
by contradiction, her cost would be at least z + 1 + ǫm2 = z + 1 +
1
m6 , while by playing rt she would pay at most
(z+1)(1− 1m8 )+(z+s)
1
m8 ≤ z+1+
1
m7 . By a union bound, there exists an action profile a = (ap)p∈N ∈×p∈NAp
played with probability at least 1− s( 1m8 +
1
m2 ) > 0 in which all the players pv are alone on their resources (either rv
or rv¯). Let τ : V → {T,F} be a truth assignment such that τ(v) = T if apv = rv¯ and τ(v) = F if apv = rv . Then, τ
satisfies all the clauses, since all the players pϕ,q play rl with τ(l) = T and, thus, all the clauses have at least one true
literal.
The following lemma concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 8. Any SCG can be represented as an NCG of size polynomial in the size of the original SCG.
Proof. Given an SCG (N,R, {Ap}p∈N , {cr}r∈R) we build an NCG (N,G, {ce}e∈E , {(sp, tp)}p∈N ), as follows. The
graph G = (V,E) has two nodes vr,1, vr,2 ∈ V for each resource r ∈ R, and, additionally, for every player p ∈ N ,
there is a source node sp ∈ V and a destination one tp ∈ V . Moreover, there is an edge (vr,1, vr,2) ∈ E for every
r ∈ R and, for every p ∈ N and r ∈ Ap, there two edges (sp, vr,1) ∈ E and (vr,2, tp) ∈ E. Finally, for the edges
e = (vr,1, vr,2), we let ce = cr, while ce = 0 for all the other edges.
5 Discussion and Future Works
The paper studies information-structure design problems in atomic BNCGs, where an informed sender can observe
the actual state of the network and commit to a signaling scheme. We focus on the problem of computing optimal ex
ante persuasive signaling schemes in such setting. We show that, with affine costs, simmetry is the property marking
the transition from polynomial-time tractability to NP-hardness.
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In the future, we are interested in studying the problem of approximating optimal ex ante persuasive signaling schemes,
and in the design of practical algorithms for real-world network signaling problems. Moreover, in order to make the
framework even more applicable, it would be interesting to explore how the sender can handle uncertainty about
receivers’ payoffs, and to be robust to mismatching priors.
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